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Abstract
An important question that has always been debated in philosophy of science concerns that of the best
account of science. Ranging from multiple accounts, from Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos, etc., an
argument of how Lakatos’s Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (MSRP) is the best account of
science will be defended. In addition, the best account of scientific evidence and explanation – featuring
philosophers from Lakatos, Peter Achinstein, Nancy Cartwright, and Philip Kitcher – is presented in support of
Lakatos’s MSRP. Furthermore, using the scientific theory of continental drift, proposed by Alfred L. Wegener,
will illustrate how Wegener’s theory fits well with Lakatos’s account of science.
Keywords: Philosophy of science, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Alfred L. Wegner, falsificationism,
naïve falsificationism, normal science, revolutionary science, ethodology of Scientific Research Programmes
(MSRP)
The principal question in science revolves
around what science is and what is the best account of
science. The question will also involve understanding
what the best account of scientific evidence and
scientific explanation are in accordance with our best
account and idea of science. Given the vast number of
accounts by philosophers, a review of Karl Popper,
Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos will be discussed
since such accounts illustrate the growth, development,
and idea of scientific knowledge. Thus, in this paper, I
argue that Imre Lakatos has the best account of science
as his idea of science best explains the growth and
history of scientific knowledge and accounts for the
issues and limitations seen in the accounts of Popper
and Kuhn. Moreover, Lakatos’s account best fits with
the account of scientific evidence as seen in his idea of
research programmes and Achinstein’s new proposal
of evidence. The best account of scientific explanation,
seen in both Nancy Cartwright’s view of conflicting

laws and Philip Kitcher’s Explanatory Unification
account also shed light into Lakatos’s account of
science.
Karl Popper: Problem of Induction and
Demarcation
As Lakatos was Popper’s student, I’ll first start
with an extensive presentation of Popper. Also, since
Kuhn’s account of science, like Lakatos, depends upon
an accurate understanding of the methods and
techniques of practicing scientists, I’ll explore the
subtle differences and some similarities in their
accounts. I will then explain the shortcomings of
Popper’s account, which are addressed by Lakatos.
In his book, The Logic of Scientific Discovery,
Popper discusses how he takes issue with inductive
methods and logic (Popper, 1959, p. 4). According to
Popper, taking singular/particular statements – from
test results or empirical observations – and inferring to
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universal statements and theories is not a strong
justification for universal conclusions (Popper, 1959).
To say that one saw a few white swans at the lake and
generalizes that, thus, all swans are white is not
justifiable. Moreover, Popper explains how the
problem of induction involves the questions of truth or
validity based on experience. To Popper, many people
believe that the truth of universal statements are
empirically based, that being “known by experience”
(Popper, 1959, p. 4). However, Popper takes issue with
this and says that empirical based experiences are “only
singular statements and not a universal one” (Popper,
1959, p. 4). So, to say that one knows the truth of a
universal statement by experience most often suggests
that the truth of such statement can be reduced to the
truth of singular statements – implying that these
singular statements are also known to be true by
experience.
Popper disagrees and says that by justifying
universal statements based on inductive inferences, one
needs to establish some sort of principle of induction
(Popper, 1959, p. 4). Yet, even establishing a principle
of induction would not suffice. Not only would the
principle not be a logical truth (such as a tautology or
analytical statement) it would be a synthetic statement
that is not contradictory but is logically possible
(Popper, 1959, p. 5). Popper takes further issue with
this saying that such a principle is superfluous and
would lead to logical inconsistencies. To justify his
dismissal of the principle, he recalls that such error was
clear in the work of David Hume (Popper, 1959, p. 11).
Popper says that for the principle of induction to work,
there must be a universal statement. And if we try to
regard the truth of this universal statement from our
experience, we need to justify it by employing
inductive inferences, which also leads to using another
inductive principle that is of a higher level (Popper,
1959). Thus, to use the principle of induction based on
experience would lead us in a never-ending regress of
justification using the principle of induction.
Popper’s Falsificationism
Popper takes issue with inductive logic as he
says it “does not provide a suitable distinguishing mark
of the empirical, non-metaphysical, character of a
theoretical system” (Popper, 1959, p. 11). In short,
inductive logic does not provide a sufficient criterion
of demarcation – which is the next main problem he

illustrates in the paper. In discussing what he labels as
the “problem of demarcation,” he expresses that the
older generation of positivists claim that what is
scientific or legitimate are “only the concepts that are
‘derived from experience.’ Concepts they believed to
be reducible down to the elements of sense-experience,
impressions, perceptions, etc.” (Popper, 1959, p. 11).
On the other hand, the modern positivists believe what
is scientific or legitimate consists not of a framework
of concepts but a system of statements (Popper, 1959).
That is, they believe in statements that can be reduced
to atomic and elementary statements of experience.
In discussing the criterion of demarcation
found in inductive logic, he states that the criterion is
like statements in empirical science having the
capability of being decided in terms of their truth and
falsity – that is these statements must be “conclusively
decidable” (Popper, 1959, p. 17). They must not only
be logically possible, but they must also be able to be
verified or falsified. Again, Popper doesn’t believe in
inductive logic and so far as the belief that inductive
statements are verified by one’s experience, he
believes induction is logically unjustifiable. This
would imply that theories can never be empirically
verifiable (Popper, 1959).
In formulating a criterion of demarcation,
Popper proposes his idea of falsificationism, which he
believes demarcates and best explains science. It is not
just falsifying the hypothesis which makes up naive
falsificationism, but the capability for a hypothesis to
be falsified by the results and outcomes. Unlike Carl
Hempel, Popper does not believe in confirmation of
results; rather, if a result is falsified, one knows that the
hypothesis no longer stands – a simple logical negation
of the consequence. If a result confirms the prediction
of an experiment, such as the fallacy of affirming the
consequence, one can only provisionally accept the
hypothesis – not conclusive nor corroborating (Popper,
1959).
Labeled by Lakatos as “Popper₁,” which is also
known as “naïve falsificationism,” Lakatos scrutinizes
Popper₁ for being untenable. The philosophy of
Popper₁ involves the idea of falsificationism, which is
based on bold falsifiable conjectures which are
essentially weeded out by counterinstances and hard
refutations (Lakatos, 1969). Popper₁ states that even
though empirical refutations don’t justify the falsity of
a refuted theory, its elimination is conclusive (Lakatos,
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1969). However, Lakatos states that Popper₁ is
unsupportable since there are instances where
falsifying hypotheses – which initially falsified a
scientific theory – were themselves refuted, thus
reinstating the falsified scientific theory (Lakatos,
1969). In addition to Lakatos not believing that
refutation itself is a sufficient reason to eliminate a
refuted theory, he believes that the method used in
Popper₁ faces a problem. The problem involving the
confusion as to which theory we should direct the
modus tollens towards in terms of the refutation
(Lakatos, 1969). In all, Lakatos views Popper₁ – that
being naïve falsificationism – as an untenable account.
Thomas Kuhn: Normal and Revolutionary Science
While Kuhn concedes with some ideas from
Popper, Kuhn discounts Popper’s falsificationism by
proposing that the “growth” of science can be
explained by two cycles in science. He believes a
“revolutionary overthrow of an accepted theory”
seldom happens in the development of science, and that
science consists of two cycles (Kuhn, 1969, p. 5). The
laborious process of carrying out research to test a
conjecture is a standard component he labels “normal
science.” However, episodes where competing theories
overthrow other theories and cause science to be in a
state of a “crisis,” related to the paradigm (framework)
shift, is labeled as “revolutionary/ extraordinary
science,” which Kuhn equates with falsificationism
(Kuhn, 1969, p. 5). For Kuhn, the perpetual cycle from
normal to revolutionary then to a new state of normal
science (Normal1 → Revolution1 = Normal2 →
Revolution2 = Normal3, etc.) is maintained by the
dogmatic role of scientists in their own paradigms.
Thus, any confounding observations seen in opposition
will not shift the paradigm or replace the entire system
– for science would be forever in flux (Kuhn, 1969).
However, Kuhn’s view of normal and
revolutionary science is disputed by J.W. Watkins who
lays out five theses challenging Kuhn’s supposition of
Normal/ Revolutionary science. Consisting of five
points, (1) Paradigm Monopoly thesis, (2) No
Interregnum thesis, (3) Incompatibility thesis, (4)
Gestalt switch thesis, which leads to the (5) Instant
paradigm thesis, Watkins rejects the latter thesis as
there are many instances of paradigms emerging at a
slow pace – like the Inverse Square Law (Watkins,
1970). Thus, if the Gestalt switch thesis leads to the

Instant paradigm thesis, and Watkins has argued that
(5) is false, that would mean that thesis (4) must be
false. And given that thesis (4) depends on the other
three theses that Watkins believes comprises Kuhn’s
account, he has an account to reject Kuhn wholesale.
Rejecting everything but the Incompatibility thesis
would mean that Kuhn’s account of science would
transform into Popper’s account of science –
falsificationism.
Furthermore, in critiquing Kuhn, Lakatos
points out that Kuhn may have only understood a
certain type of Popper, that being the naïve
falsificationist of Popper₁. Lakatos states that although
Kuhn’s criticism of Popper₁ is correct, Kuhn fails to
“understand a more sophisticated Popper (Popper₂)
whose rationality goes beyond naïve falsificationism”
(Lakatos, 1969, p. 151). Although Kuhn fails to
account for this improved version of Popper proposed
by Lakatos, Popper₂) may provide a valid explanation
for what Kuhn calls scientific revolution. In addition to
this shortcoming, knowing that Kuhn’s account would
transform into just another account of Popper’s
falsificationism combined with the understanding that
Lakatos thinks Popper’s account of falsificationism is
untenable, it would suggest that Lakatos would
probably not at all be convinced by Kuhn’s account.
Imre Lakatos’s Account of Science
After acknowledging Popper’s and Kuhn’s
account of science, it seems that Lakatos’s account is a
more middle version – sort of like Goldilocks middle –
of both philosophers’ accounts of science. To build his
account of science, Lakatos addresses three Poppers:
Popper₀, Popper₁, Popper₂ (Lakatos, 1969, p. 151).
First, Popper₀ consists of dogmatic falsificationism,
which he nor Popper believes represents
falsificationism; Popper₂ may resemble the actual
Popper, but Lakatos highlights the weaknesses in naive
falsificationism. Naive falsificationism starts off with
highly falsifiable conjectures, which are then weeded
out by hard refutations. Because only logical negations
will count as falsification, every conjecture that
expresses a logical contingency is equally falsifiable
(Lakatos, 1969). But Lakatos points out two issues
with naïve falsificationism. (1) there are some
scientists who hold onto their theories in spite of
refutations; (2) Popper₁’s mono-theoretical deductive
model, which consists of “either an explanatory theory
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judged by ‘facts’ or interpretative theory judged by
‘facts,’” is problematic (Lakatos, 1969, p. 157). With
the latter, Lakatos provides the instance of Galileo’s
observation of Jupiter and realizes that even if we
refute the consequence of a prediction, what gets
rejected can be more than one consequence. If we take
(A and B) to be our hypotheses and (C) to be our test,
where (A and B) entail (C). And the result is (¬C), then
the refutation of (C), would lead to ¬A or ¬B, i.e., ¬(A
and B). Since all antecedent hypotheses contain
multiple elements, any refutation will consist of more
than one consequence. This would be problematic for
the naïve account as if one were to reject the test, then
one wouldn’t know what consequence would be
refuted (it could be ¬A or ¬B, or both). Thus, naive
falsificationism would not be the best account.
Popper₂’s account explains the growth of scientific
knowledge. Here, Lakatos discusses that science is
made up of research programmes – Methodology of
Scientific Research Programmes (MSRPs) – which is
an admixture of a set of theories and a community of
scientists that solve problems. The research
programmes consist of a “hard core” (negative
heuristic) and a protective belt (positive heuristic).
Whereas the negative heuristic forbids us from
manipulating the hard core, the positive heuristic – that
consists of the guidelines, several conjectures,
accepted facts, auxiliary hypotheses, models, theories,
etc. – can be modified to protect the hard core of the
programme (Lakatos, 1969). Thus, bare refutations do
not refute the entire theory, as the protective belt can
mediate such objections.
Lakatos believes that the growth of scientific
knowledge within the programme requires both an
increase in empirical content and corroboration – a
progressive state in the programme (Lakatos, 1969).
Whereas Kuhn believes in a paradigm shift, or this
“whole conversion” from one paradigm to another,
Lakatos states that although there are some programme
conversions, what often happens is that an
accumulation of changes to the protective belt accrue
until even the protective belt fails to protect the
hardcore of the programme, leading to a degenerative
state – which is actually quite similar to Kuhn’s
account of the perpetual cycle and episodes of crises/
anomalies seen with normal and revolutionary science.
(Lakatos, 1969). In doing this, Lakatos addresses a
deficiency in Kuhn’s account by illustrating that “there

is good, progressive normal science and that there is
bad, degenerating normal science and Popper₂’s
demarcation criterion – in a slightly improved form –
can be used to enable us to draw a line between them”
(Lakatos, 1969, p. 167).
Using Lakatos’s account, Lakatos addresses a
shortcoming in Popper’s problem of demarcation,
making the problem of science from non-science clear.
No longer is the demarcation based on Popper’s
falsificationism, but rather on the contrast between
progressive and degenerative shifts in the programme
(Lakatos, 1969). For example, Lakatos would
distinguish astronomy as a research programme from
astrology as the latter fails to show any progressive
problem shifts, while the former has shown to be
progressive in problem shifts – with theories
succeeding its predecessors – and with more content
being discovered and corroborated to the protective
belt of the programme – such as with the theory of
continental drift.
Example of Alfred Wegner’s Theory of Continental
Drift
Using Alfred L. Wegener’s theory of
continental drift as our scientific example, one might
ask why it took so long for American scientists to
accept Wegener’s model? One reason is that there was
not a mechanism for drift. Many scientists believed
then in the Contracting Earth theory – that the
continents were the result of the contraction of Earth
(Richardson, n.d.). Although this static model wasn’t
falsified, it wasn’t rejected either until there was a
viable replacement. When Wegner published his
theory of continental drift in his 1915 paper titled “The
Origin of Continents and Oceans,” many geologists
opposed his theory, asserting that the mountains were
caused by the cooling and shrinking of Earth and that
similar fossils found across several continents were due
to ancient land bridges (Oskin, 2021). Overtime, the
scientific community accepted Wegner’s theory upon
evidence of the mechanism for continental drift.
Applying a Popperian lens, Wegner’s entire theory
wasn’t refuted simply because of counter-instances and
falsifying information. Applying a Kuhnian lens – and
reiterating a former point – it doesn’t seem like the
theory constituted a Kuhnian scientific revolution.
Thus, applying a more middle approach to Wegner’s
theory, Wegner’s theory supplemented and added itself
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onto the protective belt of the general research
programme of geology, exemplifying Lakatos’s MSRP
account of science.
With the theory of continental drift, it looks like
geology was a set of Lakatosian research programmes
rather than Kuhnian Normal Science. That is, the
history suggesting the Contracting Earth theory wasn’t
part of a protective belt; but rather there was a hole in
the theory of geology that needed to be filled. And
when plate tectonics were discovered, the theory was
then incorporated into the research programme rather
than constituting a Kuhnian revolution; it was just the
movement of a new theory into a protective belt of the
hard core of geology.
Lakatos and the Best Account of Scientific Evidence
Lakatos’s account best fits with the account of
evidence as his research programme delineates what
counts as evidence in a research programme. It is not
merely evidence that is added to the protective belt, but
rather theories and auxiliary hypotheses, which redirect
the modus tollens/ refutations away from the hard core
(Lakatos, 1969). According to Lakatos, what makes a
theory better than its rival is when the evidence (1)
contains more empirical content and (2) such content
is corroborated – that is “producing novel facts”
(Lakatos, 1969, p. 163). Moreover, his account would
best fit with Achinstein’s new proposal of scientific
evidence – which there are several accounts he lists.
First, the simple Positive Probability Account (PPA)
states that if the hypothesis given the evidence raises
the probability greater than the probability of the
hypothesis alone, P(h | e) > P(h), then (e) is potential
evidence. Second, the Naïve Positive Threshold
Account (PTA) states that (e) is potential evidence only
if P(h | e) > t, where (t) is the threshold for evidence
that can vary. However, Achinstein suggests a new
proposal, one in which he believes a combination of his
aforementioned conditions may be more successful.
The Achinstein-Style of evidence suggests that (e) is
potential evidence if it satisfies the two probability
conditions; “(1) the probability of (h) given (e) is high,
and (2) the probability that there is an explanatory
connection between (h) and (e) – given that (h) and (e)
are both true – be high” (Achinstein, 1985, p. 336). In
addition, Achinstein promotes the Principle of
Reasonable Belief in his account of evidence, which
asserts that “in light of background information (b), (e)

is evidence that (h), given (b), [only if] (e) is at least
some good reason for believing (h) (Achinstein, 1985,
p. 327).
The Achinstein-Style for evidence not only
suggests the satisfaction of these two probability
conditions, but also that such evidence serves an
epistemic purpose and good reason for belief of (h).
And this follows well with Lakatos’s account of
science as Lakatos supports that content be
corroborated and produce novel facts, similar to
Achinstein’s Principle of Reasonable Belief and idea
that evidence serves an epistemic purpose. Lakatos
would also side with Achinstein in his two probability
conditions as such potential evidence, given the high
probability, would both contribute to additional
supporting evidence and explanation in the protective
belt of Lakatos’s MSRP. Likewise, with the theory of
continental drift, it appears that even though American
geologists were on the verge of accepting a noncontracting Earth model, they rejected any evidence,
not because of dogmatism, but because the evidence
didn’t have an explanatory function in place. Yet
Wegner’s theory did accord with not only the two
probability conditions Achinstein sets forth, which
includes the explanatory function, but also the
epistemic function evidence should serve.
Considering our main scientific example of the
theory of continental drift, Wegener’s evidence would
align well with Achinstein’s new proposal as (1) the
probability of Wegener’s hypothesis given his
evidence was high; (2) the probability of an
explanatory connection between his hypothesis and
evidence – given both are true – was also high; and (3)
Wegener’s additional evidence, in light of criticisms,
suggested that there was a good reason for believing
his hypothesis. In addition, there was an epistemic
purpose to Wegener’s evidence – that being geological
knowledge and the ability to better understand how our
Earth evolves.
Lakatos and the Best Account of Scientific
Explanation
In the case of the best account of scientific
explanation, elements from Cartwright’s view of
conflicting laws and Kitcher’s Explanatory Unification
account best fit with Lakatos’s account of science,
MSRP. Hempel also has an account of explanation,
which is the Deductive-nomological model; however,
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Cartwright points out that the problem with the D-N
model is that the laws used in the D-N model which do
the explaining – the explanans – do not hold in reality
and only hold in some ideal world. And this forms
Cartwright’s view of covering laws. Since laws that are
supposed to explain the phenomenon only hold true in
the ideal realm, one must account for ceteris paribus,
all else being equal, for the law to hold; if not, then the
law would be false. Cartwright describes covering laws
in two worlds: (1) where for the most part the world is
tidy and well-regulated, and all we need is to use ceteris
paribus to explain the phenomenon, and (2) the world
is very untidy and there are so many confounding
factors that would hinder us to get us to the real
explanation (Cartwright, 1980, p. 161). Cartwright also
states that there “aren’t enough covering laws to go
around” to explain every single phenomenon; likewise,
covering laws seem to be disunified and sectioned to
their own distinct domain (Cartwright, 1980, p. 162).
Lakatos’s MSRP would agree with Cartwright’s
assertion of conflicting laws as he believes not only in
a wide array of research programmes across science,
but also that each programme is self-consistent and
need not be consistent with another program. Thus,
Cartwright suggests a unified account of explanation
not only because of these limitations, but also that
“most real-life cases involve some combination of
causes,” and that there aren’t any general laws which
explain such complex cases in science (Cartwright,
1980, p. 162).
Hence, Kitcher’s account of Explanatory
Unification is the best account of scientific explanation
paired with Lakatos’s MSRP account of science.
Kitcher’s view on scientific explanation details how,
first, the theory of explanation should not only increase
our understanding but show us how scientific
explanation advances our scientific knowledge.
Second, the theory ought to enable us to comprehend,
arbitrate, and measure our explanatory power from
competing explanatory claims (Kitcher, 1981).
Kitcher’s unification describes how a theory “unifies
our beliefs when it provides one, or a few, pattern(s) of
argument which can be used in the derivation of a large
number of sentences which we accept” (Kitcher, 1981,
p. 514). It is the theories, and the theoretical
framework, that explain disparate phenomena, and
laws only consist as part of the explanation. Take, for
example, explaining how a rock climber suspended by

a safety rope can be safely lowered by someone who
weighs less than the climber. While a Newtonian
explanation will focus on various force laws to show
that the weight of the climber is distributed through the
system of hooks, and that the force required to suspend
the climber is the sum of all the forces at work in the
system, the weight of the climber also plays a key
premise in explanation. With all this, the argument will
consist of the same pattern as any other force argument,
just that the content is different. In this case, the
climber explanation will be subsumed under the
Newtonian program due to its theoretical elements,
structures and patterns that make up the theory. It is the
theoretical structure and pattern of the program that
unifies both explanations. Lakatos’s MSRP would
differentiate a covering law account like Hempel from
Kitcher’s unification account as Lakatos would believe
that Hempel’s D-N model would not suffice as
scientific explanation as such laws, and non-laws,
would only be true under ideal conditions; thus, there
would be no deduction from such laws. However,
Lakatos would differentiate Hempel’s covering law
from Kitcher’s account as the latter would not only
resolve Hempel’s limitation, but it would tie well with
Lakatos’s MSRP, seeing that the explanations are
aimed toward an epistemic function, such as increasing
our understanding and explanatory power. Moreover,
the unification account details how the theoretical
framework and theories “do the explaining,” which
Lakatos would agree as this reflects his idea of the
protective belt that helps explain and protect the hard
core from anomalies and competing theories.
Conclusion
Lakatos’s MSRP is the best account of science
as he describes how research programmes are not like
Popper’s naive falsificationism account, but rather
consisting of a hard core surrounded by a protective
belt of theories, auxiliary hypotheses, etc., all
undergoing a progressive or degenerative state. As
opposed to Kuhn, Lakatos takes into account not a
paradigm shift, but rather a gradual shift in the
protective belt of the programme. Moreover, Lakatos’s
MSRP best fits with his own account of scientific
evidence, such as the progressive/ degenerative state,
and Achinstein’s new proposal of scientific evidence,
which consists of two probability conditions with an
explanatory connection and evidence serving an
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epistemic purpose and good reason for belief.
Lakatos’s account also fits well with Cartwright’s view
of conflicting laws and Kitcher’s account of
unification, in that it is explanation that increases our
explanatory power and understanding of the world, and
that it is the theories and theoretical framework that
provide the explanation – as laws alone do not explain
much. Furthermore, it is clear that Lakatos’s MSRP is
the best account as it is applicable to at least one
discipline in science – the theory of continental drift.
Out of all possible accounts of science, Lakatos’s
account is better than all others because of the reasons
and examples provided.
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